Tolga Sakman, President of the Center for Diplomatic Relations and Political Research (DİPAM), wrote about the security debates in the EU and the agreements made to ensure the security of Europe despite Brexit for AA Analysis.
The relationship between Britain and Germany can generally be considered as an effective but silent alliance. However, relations gained momentum after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, intensified after Brexit, and reached a new phase with the Russia-Ukraine War. Despite this recovery, political factors, different perceptions of geopolitical threats and different strategic cultures have so far been partially insufficient to concretely deepen relations.
British Defense Minister John Healey and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius signed a defense agreement on October 23, opening a new page in British-German military cooperation. The Trinity House Agreement drives the deepening relationship between Europe’s two highest defense spending states, focusing on increasing military cooperation in all domains: air, land, sea, space and cyber. This initiative, which is an important step for the security of NATO and Europe, has a critical content in strengthening the collective defense capabilities of both countries.
The agreement envisages cooperation in different forms. First of all, the focus will be on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank in the Baltic States, and joint exercises and training will be held between the British and German armies in order to provide a more consistent and effective deterrent against a possible attack from Russia. The two countries will share logistics, warehousing and supply capabilities, improving operational efficiency and reducing costs. According to the agreement, ground forces will be ready to defend NATO territory in the event of an attack. On the other hand, the German “P8 Poseidon” maritime patrol aircraft was launched from RAF Lossiemouth base in Scotland to increase security over the North Atlantic, to provide advanced surveillance and operational capabilities to protect vital sea lanes, above all to report the entry of Russian submarines into the Atlantic from the Barents Sea. He will serve “periodically”.
There are also articles of cooperation between the two countries in the field of defense industry. This cooperation covers large-caliber gun artillery barrels, long-range missiles, UAVs and manned platforms such as future 6th generation fighter jets and similar products. It is also promised that the work will be carried out in close coordination with other allies, such as France, to ensure that European defense systems remain at the cutting edge of military technology.
– Security concerns in Europe and the effects of Brexit
As a result of the recent increasing threats, the European Union (EU) is trying to increase the defense capacity of both the Union structurally and its member states with new institutions, decisions and funds. However, policy makers do not have a strong hand in ensuring that all these expenditures strengthen the defense mechanism. That’s why European governments want to work more with militarily powerful allies in the region. However, the Union was affected by the departure of a member state with one of the two largest defense budgets. In theory, it is clear that the UK has much to offer to European security and defense and that the remaining EU governments want to benefit from British experience, relationships and assets. Even after Brexit, everyone agrees that a defense issue affecting the EU and its member states will directly affect the UK’s national interests, and vice versa.
However, the EU is looking for something more important in European arms policy. The fact that industrial interests play an important role must be interpreted in the context of the existence of the major countries in the Union with their own arms companies that partly compete with each other. On the other hand, the British defense industry is one of the largest on the continent and is immune to competition within the EU. However, since the EU defense fund is related to the EU internal market, so far only companies from the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries can participate in this fund, and the British are not in demand within the scope of this fund.
On the other hand, an increasing security debate across Europe, and the uncertainty of how Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House will affect NATO and especially the war in Ukraine, leads to calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and to the rise of the idea of strategic autonomy. .
It seems difficult for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy in general without Britain. It has become clear in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) activities over the past 15 years that strong leadership of member states is required for strategic autonomy. Conducting operations within the Union will become increasingly difficult without the UK. Because, during the period of Britain’s membership, it was announced that it had a considerable amount of military personnel and equipment within the EU force accumulation.
– Agreement efforts despite Brexit
The deal appears to be part of a wider plan to forge closer ties between the UK and its major European allies, both on NATO and bilateral terms. Labour’s Defense Secretary John Healey’s plans to travel to Ukraine, France, Germany, Estonia and Poland in July upon taking office suggest that European security will indeed be the new British government’s top foreign and defense priority.
With Britain and Germany now Europe’s two biggest defense spenders and Ukraine’s two biggest military supporters in Europe, London and Berlin are key to the continent’s security. This definition translates into an ambitious partnership aimed at contributing to the deterrence and defense of Europe, not only on NATO’s eastern flank, but also in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The next step will be to restart the Lancaster House Agreement signed between Britain and France in 2010. Attempts continue to overcome the defense-based tension between England and France due to AUKUS in 2021.
One of the ideas of the Trinity House Agreement is to strengthen these three major European countries through bilateral agreements. The UK foresees unity in European defense, but does not want to risk restarting the debate on Brexit by taking initiative for institutional security and defense unity with the EU and starting a negotiation process. On the other hand, the current conditions for third country participation in EU defense initiatives without formal association remain unacceptable to London. Therefore, London will likely seek to keep its more immediate bilateral goals in line with its plans for the EU-UK security relationship.
[Dr. Tolga SAKMAN is the President of the Center for Diplomatic Relations and Political Research (DİPAM).]
